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THE HOUSE OF MOUSE AND BEYOND:
ASSESSING THE SEC'S EFFORTS TO REGULATE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
JENNIFER S. MARTIN†
ABSTRACT
What can or should be done, if anything, to address complaints that corporate
executives are overpaid? This article argues that the Securities and Exchange
Commission is making progress in the area of disclosure of executive
compensation. The SEC will not accomplish any substantial reform regarding
compensation as a wider issue, however, because shareholders do not have much
of a role in establishing executive compensation packages and have little ability
to challenge board decisions after receiving the mandated disclosure. Analyzing
the Proposed Regulations and the Delaware Supreme Court decision In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, this article sheds light on how a gap has arisen
in the area of executive compensation regulation. It demonstrates how state law
regulates gross negligence, waste and, perhaps, bad faith, while federal law
focuses on disclosure of certain compensation packages. The different focii of
state and federal regulations creates a gap for behavior that might be adverse to
shareholder interests, yet occur beyond the shareholders’ ability to effectuate
changes. Moreover, compensation decisions have characteristics that distinguish
them from routine board decisions since the attributes of arms-length contracting
are compromised. Additionally, while disclosure of compensation data is
important, it is not the equivalent of merit review and issues of information
overload, boilerplate and complexity remain. If the SEC is truly committed to
reforming executive compensation, it must address the gap in regulation
remaining after In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation. The SEC and
states could work cooperatively to implement more meaningful corporate
governance reform to ensure that shareholders both have the information
necessary to make informed investment decisions and the ability to effect changes
in company decision-making.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why are corporate executives paid so much and what are we doing about it?1 In the
period between 1992 and 2000 alone, the compensation of chief executive officers
1

The issue of the composition of and approach to executive pay has been the subject of extensive
examination. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation Chapter 8 (2004) [hereinafter, Pay without Performance]; Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, 1 Berkeley Business Law
Journal 291 (2004)(arguing that corporate boards have been able to camouflage compensation through
retirement benefits and other payments) [hereinafter Stealth Compensation]; Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005) (analysis of the magnitude and
composition of executive pension arrangements)[hereinafter Executive Pensions]; Mark J. Lowenstein, The
Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000)(reviewing and evaluating
the theories of executive compensation); James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance: Rising Above the “Pay-for-Performance Principle, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2006)(arguing that
pay for performance and agency theories are faulty); William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament Over
Executive Compensation: Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
93 CA. L. R. 1557 (2005)(observing that management power matters and evaluating arguments about
compensation practice); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TX. L. R.
1615 (2005)(arguing no reform is needed and that the management power rests with the board solely);
Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What
Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. LEE L. R. 231 (2006)(examining the characteristics of a large
number of executive employment contracts); Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?,
54 HAST. L. J. 437 (2003)(arguing that gaps between management and worker wages can affect company
value).
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(CEOs) at S&P 500 companies more than quadrupled, from $3.5 million to $14.7
million.2 In 1991, the average large company CEO earned about 140 times the wage of
the average company employee, but by 2003 it was 500 times.3 In 2005 the average CEO
pay rose twenty-seven percent, compared to a rise of thirty-eight percent in 2004, while
ordinary workers wages remained stagnant.4 Quite often these increases in compensation
continue even where the corporation struggles with results.5 Other questions persist
about whether executive compensation rewards performance of the executive or gains
unrelated to the efforts of the executive.6 Of course, a high pay package itself does not
indicate that the CEO’s pay is too much or not competitive.7
The debate concerning executive compensation packages has been much in the news and
in the Courts.8 As to whether these high increases in executive compensation are a
2

Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 1; Patrick McGeehan, Options in the Mirror, Bigger than they
Seem, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (describing how Lehman Brothers has used stock option
grants and valuation to obscure compensation to its CEO). Although much of the focus is on the most
highly paid CEOs, there are indications that the CEOs of smaller companies have experienced substantial
pay gains as well. Amy Cortese, Smaller Fish are Also Doing Swimmingly, New York Times, April 9,
2006, Sec. 3, at 7.
3
Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 1. But see, Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive
Compensation, supra note 1, at 5-6 (arguing that comparisons to rank and file workers are not helpful as
CEO payment involves stock options, whereas average worker pay does not).
4
Eric Dash, C.E.O. Pay Keeps Rising and Bigger Rises Faster, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at
5 (citing to a Pearl Meyers survey of 200 CEOs included).
5
Eric Dash, C.E.O. Pay Keeps Rising and Bigger Rises Faster, supra note 4, at 5 (boards at auto, retail and
telecommunications companies increased CEO compensation in the wake of bad financial results); Eric
Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 5 detailing
the rising compensation practices of ConAgra even during financial difficulties); Tommy McCall, Pay For
Performance? Sometimes, but Not Always, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (outlining where
stock prices fell, yet CEOs still paid well). But see, Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive
Compensation, supra note 1, at 6-7 (arguing that analysis of pay to performance is not helpful because it is
difficult to assess what is performance).
6
See, e.g., J. Alex Tarquinio, Pay for Oil Chiefs Spiked Like Prices, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec.
3, at 10 (describing the huge CEO packages for those in the oil industry in 2005, such as Exxon Mobil and
Occidental Petroleum CEOs);Tommy McCall, Pay For Performance? Sometimes, but Not Always, New
York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (CEO pay is often greater than shareholder return by 10 points).
7
See, e.g., Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1-2; Andrew R.
Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May-June 1992, at 28; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125; Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation
Excessive?, in The Attack on Corporate America 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) ("Competition
among corporations . . . sets the level of executive compensation."); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of
Corporate Law, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 959, 975-78 (1980) (market forces will eliminate "excessive"
compensation). But see, Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American
Executives (1991)(arguing that overpayment exists); Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE,
June 30, 2006 (80% of Americans think that CEOs are paid too much).
8
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466. See also,
Disney Investors Seek Reversal of Ovitz Ruling Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2006, C4; Benjamin
Pimentel, HP Sued over Fiorina’s $42 Million in Exit Pay; Shareholders Say Company, Directors
Disregarded Own Rules with Golden Parachute, San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 2006, at C1 (two
institutional investors sued HP over Fiorina severance package allegedly in violation of board policy);
Sanders v. Wang, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999)(shareholder challenge to granting of stock
plan benefiting executives). See also, e.g., Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE, June 30,
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problem, there is much debate. Orin Kramer, the Chaiman of the New Jersey State
Investment Council, commented:
And if you say, "Well, for senior executives, compensation has risen three
and a half times faster than it has for average workers," then you can say,
"That makes sense if either (a) there's a declining pool of people who can
do these jobs, or (b) the job got something like three and a half times
harder, or (c) maybe they're creating three and a half times as much value
as executives used to create." If you have problems with those
conclusions, the compensation levels are probably a little bit high.9
Shareholders, employees and the public in general are often displeased with executive
compensation levels. Shareholder litigation brought against the board of the Walt Disney
Company after they gave a $130 million severance package to Michael Ovitz has
attracted much publicity and the recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court will be
dissected for some time.10 Shareholder complaints over former HP CEO, Carly Fiorina’s
$42 million severance package has led to new litigation.11 Employees at struggling
companies such as ConAgra in Omaha Nebraska have seen their wages not keep pace
with the cost of living and their bonuses eliminated at the same time that the former
chairman and chief executive, Bruce Rohde, received bonuses, stock options and later
retired with a $20 million package.12 It is hard to forget the public outrage toward former
General Electric CEO Jack Welch when during his divorce proceedings it was discovered
that his retirement package included Red Sox tickets, a luxury apartment in New York
City, country club memberships and use of a GE corporate jet.13
The current system of executive compensation raises a number of important issues.
First, investors rely on the availability of accurate disclosure of complete compensation
data to assess company prospects and “stealth” or undisclosed compensation is an
impediment to shareholder decision-making.14 Second, the “considerable influence” that
2006 (“the outrage has grown so intense that the country’s top CEOs are now vigorously debating the
problem in private”).
9
Orin Kramer, Pay Without Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. Corp. L. 773
(2005). In fact, a Watson Wyatt Worldwide survey of directors and institutional investors found that while
only sixty-one percent of directors think that executives are overpaid, ninety percent of institutional
investors believe executives are overpaid. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive
Pay Model Mixed Reviews, Watson Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (last visited July 18, 2006).
10
In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466. See also, Disney
Investors Seek Reversal of Ovitz Ruling Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2006, at C4..
11
Benjamin Pimentel, HP Sued over Fiorina’s $42 Million in Exit Pay; Shareholders Say Company,
Directors Disregarded Own Rules with Golden Parachute, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, March 8, 2006, at
C1.
12
Eric Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, NEW YORK TIMES, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3,
page 1.
13
Disclosure Won't Tame C.E.O. Pay, The New York Times, January 14, 2006, at C1.
14
Chairman Cox speech of January 17, 2006, available at Securities Exchange Commission Website,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm (last visited July 6, 2006)[hereinafter
“Cox Speech”]. For a discussion of “stealth compensation” via retirement benefits, see Stealth
Compensation, supra note 1, at 293.
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executives have over their pay and the “influence” used to obtain it suggests that armslength contracting may not be present to the detriment of shareholders and employees.15
Perhaps most importantly, even where shareholders have enhanced disclosure,
shareholders do not have a substantial role in establishing executive compensation and
little ability to challenge compensation decisions afterwards.16
During a speech given on January 17, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairman Christopher Cox announced proposed revisions to the SEC’s existing rules
(Existing Regulations) governing the disclosure of executive compensation (the Proposed
Rules).17 The SEC subsequently published the Proposed Regulations, including a lengthy
“Background and Overview” section detailing the SEC's assessment of the problem.18
The SEC has received more than 20,000 public comments to its notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) and voted affirmatively to adopt changes to the Existing
Rules on July 26, 2006.19 Characterizing the Existing Regulations as “out of date,” SEC
Chairman Cox declared the SEC’s purpose “is to help investors keep an eye on how
much of their money is being paid to the top executives who work for them.”20
Commissioner Cox expressed concern that companies are not disclosing compensation
information properly.21
The Proposed Regulations deal with not only compensation issues, but related party
transactions, director independence, and corporate governance.22 Among other things, the
Proposed Regulations establish a federal minimum threshold of $10,000 as a trigger for
the disclosure of perks, require disclosure of retirement and severance packages,
reorganize the overall presentation of disclosed compensation materials, and require
disclosure of outstanding equity interests, including potential amounts the executive will
receive in the future.23 The Proposed Regulations also require certain disclosures aimed
at identifying independent directors and ensuring that related party transactions are more
fully disclosed.24
15

Stealth Compensation, supra note 1, at 293.
See infra Part IV.C.
17
Cox speech, supra note 14. For the current requirements, see Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Release No. 33–6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48125 (Oct. 16, 1992) [hereinafter the‘‘1992 Release’’]; See also
Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests, Release No. 33–7032, 58
Fed. Reg. 63010, at Section II (Nov. 22, 1993).
18
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (2006)[hereinafter Proposed
Regulations].
19
SEC Press Release of July 26, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm (last visited August 5, 2006).
20
Cox Speech, supra note 13.
21
Id.
22
Cox Speech, supra note 13. See Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542. The SEC proposed a
transition period for the Proposed Regulations with the earliest portions of the Proposed Regulations having
effect sixty days after publication of final rules and the remainder of the rules, such as those related to the
summary compensation table that will ultimately require a three year presentation, being phased-in over a
longer time period so companies will not be required to restate historical data. 71 Fed. Reg., at 6583.
23
SEC Press Release, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-10.htm (last visited January 27,
2006); Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6543-45, 6551 (summarizing the regulations).
24
SEC Press Release, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-10.htm (last visited January 27,
2006); Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542, 6544, 6571-73. There has been controversy over the
16
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Chairman Cox commented that it is not the government’s “job” to determine the
appropriate level of executive compensation.25 Rather, it is the role of the shareholders
and the board of directors.26 The SEC’s primary initiative is aimed at full disclosure of
all issues that affect compensation decisions. Although the SEC initially requested
comments to be completed by April, 2006, the SEC extended the comment period in this
case.27 After closing the comment period, the SEC will consider and respond to material
comments28 received before finalizing the Proposed Regulations, such that the revisions
will not likely be in force until 2007.
Response to the SEC’s NPRM has been overall positive, but with various refinements
suggested by commentators.29 Some in Congress, however, believe that the NPRM does
not go far enough and that more comprehensive federal regulation is in order.30 House
Bill 4291 calls for more substantial reform that would include shareholder votes on
certain compensation packages.31 Corporations, corporate counsel and company
advocates, already under siege from shareholder complaints about lucrative compensation
packages, appear to have taken the NPRM seriously and filed numerous comments
seeking to lessen the impact of the Proposed Regulations.32
effectiveness and meaning of independent directors. See, e.g., Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and
the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129 (2006).
25
Cox Speech, supra note 13.
26
Cox Speech, supra note 13. Cox commented: “It is their job [the shareholders and directors], not the
government's, to determine how best to align executive compensation with corporation performance, to
determine the appropriate levels of executive pay, and to decide on the metrics for determining it.”
27
Securities and Exchange Commission Website, supra note 15. As of July 6, 2006, the SEC was still
receiving comments to the Proposed Regulations.
28
See generally, e.g., St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
29
See, e.g., Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(applauding and
supporting the SEC’s efforts); Comment of Pearl Meyer & Partners, Securities and Exchange Commission
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jrich7010.pdf
(last visited July 6, 2006)(commending the SEC); Comments of Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/s70306-632.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(expressing strong
support for the NPRM).
30
See, Comment of Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006). See also,
Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005)(referred to the
Committee on Financial Services)[hereinafter “Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act”].
31
See Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, supra note 26.
32
See, e.g., Comment of Steve Odland , Business Roundtable, Securities and Exchange Commission
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 6,
2006); Comment of Christine Richards, Fed Ex Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/fedex041006.pdf (last visited July 6,
2006); Comment of W. Wayne Withers, Emmerson Electric, Securities and Exchange Commission
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/emerson041006.pdf (last visited July 6,
2006); Comment of Linda Rappaport and George Spera, Shearman & Sterling, LLP, on behalf of CBS
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While the SEC was publishing the NPRM, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its
decision in the case In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (In re Walt
Disney).33 The Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s decision in favor of the corporate
defendants and underscored that existing fiduciary duty, good faith and waste theories
apply equally to the executive compensation arena.34 While SEC Chairman Cox has
stated that the federal government is not in the business of policing executive
compensation decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court seems to have declared its intent to
stay out of the business in any meaningful way as well.
The position of the SEC and the result of In re Walt Disney raise issues regarding
gatekeeping of executive compensation matters. If the SEC’s rules will only mandate
disclosure, does state law provide an alternative means by which the shareholders can
meaningfully challenge executive compensation approved by the board of directors? As
evidenced by In re Walt Disney, shareholders face a difficult task in challenging the
decisions of the board of directors regarding compensation packages if made in good
faith and with reasonable information. Will the Proposed Regulations result in
substantial change in compensation practices?
This Article will critically evaluate the proposed rulemaking on executive compensation
announced on January 17, 2006 by SEC Chairman Cox. The Article takes a look at the
limits of disclosure as a mechanism to police executive compensation packages. The
Article will focus on the SEC’s assertion that previous rules are simply out of date,
justifying mere updating, rather than comprehensive overhaul. The SEC has stated that is
focusing on information disclosure (wage information, not wage controls). The Article
outlines the issue of accountability to shareholders even in the face of disclosure. It
presents additional alternatives to the method chosen by the SEC. The Article concludes
that while the Proposed Regulations will require the disclosure of more executive
compensation data, the importance of which cannot be understated, beyond that the rules
won’t give shareholders any additional options to address concerns. The Proposed
Regulations are only a piece of the executive compensation picture as they do not provide
for real and meaningful accountability to shareholders
Part II focuses on federal and state jurisdiction for, and regulation of, executive
compensation decisions. The SEC maintains that its jurisdiction over executive
compensation is limited to information disclosure. The SEC argues that the board and
shareholders are vested with actual decision-making authority over such matters,
presumably under state corporate law. Even if true, the SEC has failed to highlight the
gap existing between where the SEC has asserted authority over executive compensation
disclosure and the limited shareholder powers actually existing under state law, as
Corporation, The Walt Disney Company, NBC Universal (a majority-owned subsidiary of General
Electric Company), News Corporation, and Viacom Inc., Securities and Exchange Commission Website,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/shearmansterling041006.pdf (last visited July 6,
2006).
33
In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.
34
Id.
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evidenced by In re Walt Disney. Broad protections exist under state law for board
decisions (including those on compensation matters) that will be unaffected by the SEC’s
Proposed Regulations.
Part III looks at the benefits of the SEC’s Proposed Regulations in terms of increased
information disclosure on a wide variety of compensation topics, including the the crucial
areas of perquisites and retirement and severance packages. Part IV canvasses some of
the apparently unanticipated consequences of this dual federal and state regulation of
executive compensation, focusing on the reasons why the Proposed Regulations will not
fix the problem of excessive compensation. Finally, Part V addresses the relative
strengths of some of the various alternatives available to the federal and state
governments to address the gap in regulation, particularly with regard to federal
intervention, allowing shareholder referendums on executive compensation matters,
increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis directors and the issues raised by self regulation.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that while the SEC’s Proposed Regulations represent
an important first step toward reform in the area of disclosure of executive compensation
data, not much will change for the investing public. Additional action by the state or
federal governments would be needed if we really want to empower shareholder choice.
II. Jurisdiction for and Regulation of Executive Compensation
A. The SEC and its Rulemaking Authority
The authority of the SEC has traditionally centered on the disclosure requirements of the
1933 Securities Act (1933 Act)35 and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (Exchange
Act).36 Nevertheless, the SEC has on occasion been accused of creativity in construing
its own jurisdiction to regulate.37 As far back as the 1960’s, the SEC began to take an
expanded view of its jurisdiction beyond traditional disclosure by bringing cases aimed
at protecting the public against “fraud” generally.38 In general, courts have shown
substantial deference to the interpretation by a federal agency of its own statutory
authority.39 This deference with respect to the SEC has not been unlimited and the
35

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988). Felix Frankfurter promoted the 1933 Act as able "[t]o
build on self discipline by all agencies engaged in marketing securities by compelling full publicity of
'every essentially important element attending the issue of new securities' so that the public may have an
opportunity to understand what it buys" Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Security Act, FORTUNE, Aug.
1933, at 53. See also, Roberta Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution 40-41 (1982).
36
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
37
See, e.g., Philip Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act: Where
Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. Corp. L. 311 (1992); Lacey and
George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 JTLP 119 (1998).
38
See, In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
39
See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 813-15 (1995);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-making in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-103 (1994).
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Supreme Court concluded in Santa Fe v. Green40 that federal securities laws do not
"federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would
be overridden."41
Today, Chairman Cox describes the SEC’s mission as follows: “to protect investors; to
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and to facilitate capital formation.’’42 Believing
that ‘‘[a]n educated investing public ultimately provides the best defense against fraud and
costly mistakes,’’ the SEC has primarily focused its regulatory reach on requiring companies
to disclose extensive information for review by the SEC and the public and on general public
education programs.43
The SEC adopted the Existing Regulations in 1992, which focus on disclosure and use a
series of formatted tables capturing compensation data over several years.44 The SEC has
itself criticized the tables as “highly formatted and rigid.”45 The Existing Regulations
include a Performance Graph and Compensation Committee Report relaying in a detailed
manner compensation and corporate performance, as reflected by stock price.46 The SEC
has criticized the Compensation Committee Report as leading to boilerplate discussion
and the Performance Graph as “outdated.”47 The Compensation Committee Report has
been furnished to, rather than filed with, the SEC by the compensation committee of a
company, such that Exchange Act liability for misstatements does not attach.48 The SEC
believed that furnishing the data would help spur more open and robust conversation on
executive compensation.49
The SEC does not venture beyond the current disclosure regulatory approach with the
Proposed Regulations. The SEC has some rulemaking authority concerning executive
compensation as part of its fraud protection mandate, and, in fact, has regulated
disclosure of executive compensation for some time.50 The SEC's specific jurisdiction to
40

430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 479. For a discussion of the SEC’s attempts to regulate corporate governance matters, see Roberta
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 79, at 86-87 (2005)[hereinafter, Karmel, Realizing
the Dream]. See also, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (SEC rule on voting
power exceeded authority under the Exchange Act).
42
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 2, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml (last visited July 10, 2006).
43
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 5, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml (last visited July 10, 2006).
44
Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33–6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48125 (Oct. 16, 1992)
(hereinafter the ‘‘1992 Release’’).
45
Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6545.
46
1992 Release, supra note 40.
47
Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547.
48
1992 Release, supra note 40.
49
1992 Release, supra note 40, at Section II.H.
50
The SEC first regulated executive compensation disclosure in 1938. Release No. 34–1823 (Aug. 11,
1938). In one recent enforcement action, the SEC reached a settlement with Tyson Foods and its former
CEO, Donald Tyson, with Tyson Foods paying a penalty of $1.5 million and Donald Tyson paying a
$700,000 penalty for misleading disclosures of compensation information. U.S. Securities and Exchange
41
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regulate disclosure of executive compensation generally lies in the 1933 Act and the
Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.51 By continuing
the longstanding disclosure approach to executive compensation, the SEC is remaining
consistent with its stated mission and tradition.
By failing to go farther with executive compensation, and seeking congressional authority
as needed, however, the SEC may be using its regulatory authority over disclosure
matters to accomplish very little. If one accepts the SEC’s conclusion that it is limited to
disclosure in the area of executive compensation, do states have remaining jurisdiction
over executive compensation? If so, to what extent has this authority been exercised?
These questions are taken up below.
B. Shareholder Rights Under State Law
The Proposed Regulations must be considered in the context of state regulation of
executive compensation as well, since there is overlapping jurisdiction regarding
regulation of compensation matters. In practice, the most important affirmative initiative
available under state law to shareholders objecting to executive compensation is suing the
individual members of the board of directors.52 In general, the board is vested with the
authority to manage the corporation with the business judgment rule protecting decisionmaking.53 The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized, though, that the core of a
board’s protection under the business judgment rule requires informed decision making.
54
“[A] director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a
duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”55 Gross negligence is the standard
for determining whether decision-making was informed for purposes of the business
judgment rule.56
Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 7, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml (last visited July 10, 2006).
51
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6598. The SEC cited authority
under “Sections 3(b), 6, 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act, as amended, Sections 10(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d)
and 23(a) of the Exchange Act, as amended, and Sections 8, 20(a), 24(a), 30 and 38 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended.”
52
See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466. See, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 571(examining 124 cases where shareholders
have brought claims of excessive compensation and concluding that shareholders are more likely to find
success against smaller corporations when litigating outside of Delaware).
53
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (DE. 1985).
54
Id. at 872-73.
55
Id. at 872-73.
56
Id. at 873. While Delaware courts have not precisely defined gross negligence, it is more than simple
negligence. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DE. 1984) (“predicated upon concepts of
gross negligence”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (DE. 1971), rev'g, 261 A.2d 911 (DE
Ch.1969) ("fraud or gross overreaching"); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (DE. 1970),
rev'g, 255 A.2d 717 (DE. Ch. 1969) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d
487, 492-93 (DE. 1966) ("bad faith ... or a gross abuse of discretion"); Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d
749, 750 (DE. 1963) ("fraud or gross abuse of discretion"); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349,
351 (DE. Ch. 1972) ("directors may breach their fiduciary duty ... by being grossly negligent"); Kors v.
Carey, Del.Ch., 158 A.2d 136, 140 (1960) ("fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion"); Allaun v.
Consolidated Oil Co., Del.Ch., 147 A. 257, 261 (1929) ("reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard
of the stockholders"). Additionally, the burden of proof is on the party challenging the board’s decision to
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Furthermore, the duty of care inquiry focuses on process only. The Delaware Supreme
Court has observed that substantive due care:
is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or
quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are
reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making context is
process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business
judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste
test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith,
which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.57
Accordingly, shareholder claims against the board of directors often center on satisfaction
of the board’s procedural duty of care in the decision-making process, though litigation
often also includes claims of lack of good faith and waste.
1. Delaware Developments Regarding the Duty of Care
Rulings of the Delaware Supreme Court outline a board’s duty of care and have been the
subject of extensive commentary. Delaware cases, in particular Smith v. Van Gorkom,58
create a murky picture of a board’s responsibility of informed decision-making versus the
shareholders right to challenge board decisions.59 This article will not undertake an indepth review of Smith v. Van Gorkom, as extensive consideration of this case has been
provided by others.60
To counter the Van Gorkom imposition of personal liability on board members, the
Delaware General Assembly acted swiftly to limit its effect on other corporations by
enacting Delaware Code § 102(b)(7).61 Section 102(b)(7) permits corporations to include
in the certificate of incorporation a provision to exculpate board members from personal
liability for breaches of duty of care, though not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith
establish facts rebutting the presumption of informed decision-making under the business judgment rule.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DE. 1984).
57
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.2000).
58
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 898-99 (Del. 1985). The shareholders’ claim against the board in
the case arose in the context of the board’s decision for a cash out merger of Trans Union into a new
corporation. After little negotiations and a scant two hour meeting, the Trans Union board approved merger
with a new company formed by Pritzker for $55 per share. Id. at 868-69.
59
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a).
60
See, e.g., The Smith v. Van Gorkom Symposium, 45 Washburn L. J. 267 (2006); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 477 (2000) and Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 595
(2002); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41
Bus. Law. 1, 1 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
Law. 1437, 1455 (1985); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of
Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 583
(2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision-making in Corporate Governance, 55
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 54 (2002).
61
65 Del. Laws, c. 289 (1986).
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violations and certain other violations.62 Many Delaware corporations responded by
adopting charter provisions containing such exculpatory language.63
Section 102(b)(7) is important for two primary reasons. First, the widespread approval of
Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions by shareholders is a strong indicator that
shareholders will tolerate a certain amount of risk taking by directors and believe that it
should not create personal liability.64 Second, it precludes exculpation of directors who
self deal or do not act in good faith, representing legislative intolerance of directors who
breach the basic trust given by the shareholders.65
Despite apparent legislative intention to put the issue to rest, section 102(b)(7) did not
resolve all questions regarding director liability for breaches of the duty of care even for
corporations enacting the exculpatory charter provisions. With regard to cases alleging
only a duty of care violation, Delaware courts have consistently upheld the effectiveness
of section 102(b)(7) provisions when litigated and dismiss cases once the defense is
raised.66 On the other hand, even in the context of a corporation with a section 102(b)(7)
charter provision, shareholders can plead causes of action alleging board breaches of the
duty of care that also involve the duty of loyalty or good faith. These cases survive a
motion to dismiss and are allowed to proceed to trial.
A duty of loyalty claim would invoke the higher standard of review of fairness.67 The
Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the fairness analysis cannot be avoided by a
motion to dismiss even where a Section 102(b)(7) provision applies because “[t]he
category of transactions that require judicial review pursuant to the entire fairness
standard ab initio do so because, by definition, the inherently interested nature of those
transactions are inextricably intertwined with issues of loyalty.”68 Where the
shareholders allege a duty of loyalty claim, section 102(b)(7) exculpates the board from a
finding of liability only if the transaction is found to be unfair and the unfairness was
exclusively due to a breach of the duty of care.69 The cases that are beyond the
exculpatory reach of section 102(b)(7) highlight the remaining questions regarding board
liability when faced with shareholder claims involving both the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty.
62

8 Del C. § 102(b)(7).
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); see E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for
Judicial Decision-making in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 693-94 (1998); see also E. Norman
Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification
and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401-04 (1987).
64
Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decision-making in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. at 69394.
65
Id. at 694.
66
See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, Del.Supr., 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787
A.2d 85, 91 (2001); Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del.Supr., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (1996); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav.
Bancorp., Inc., Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1270, 1288 (1994).
67
See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 144 (“The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.”). See also,
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094 (“entire fairness”).
68
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 93.
69
Emerald Partners, 787 S.2d at 98.
63
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2. In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
The Delaware Supreme Court did not revisit directly the questions left open by Van
Gorkom and Section 102(b)(7) until more than twenty years later.70 In June 2006, the
Court provided some clarification of the application of the duty of care, as well as good
faith and waste, when it decided In re Walt Disney.71 In re Walt Disney Co. considered
the actions of the board of the Walt Disney Company (Disney) in entering into an
employment agreement with Michael Ovitz (Ovitz) as President. The agreement resulted
in the payment to Ovitz of a $130 million severance package when he was dismissed
after just fourteen months of service.72 Michael Eisner (Eisner), was the company’s
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and also had a social relationship with Ovitz.
Eisner, along with Irwin Russell, a director and the Chairman of the Compensation
Committee, approached Ovitz about joining Disney.73
The Ovitz employment agreement (OEA) was modeled after other employment
agreements Disney had used previously. The OEA contained no fault termination
provisions with a significant severance package (NFT) in the event that Ovitz was
terminated for anything other than gross negligence or malfeasance.74 Prior to
concluding the OEA, Disney hired Graef Crystal, an executive compensation consultant.
Raymond Watson, another member of the compensation committee, worked with Crystal
to evaluate the OEA.75 The Disney compensation committee met at some point later and
approved the terms of the OEA, after reviewing the term sheet, presentations by Watson
and Russell and discussion.76 Later that same day, the full Disney board met, and after
discussion and deliberations, elected Ovitz as President.77 When Ovitz was not as
successful as Disney desired, the relationship deteriorated. Ovitz was dismissed without
formal board action a mere fourteen months later under the NFT provisions of the OEA,
as there was no cause to dismiss.78 In reaction, the shareholders brought a derivative suit
against Ovitz and the board.79
70

While during this period the Delaware Supreme Court did not decide any cases directly involving a
board’s duty of care (and none involving compensation issues), it did decide several cases that raised duty
of loyalty issues and the overlap with section 102(b)(7). See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, Del.Supr., 780
A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (2001); Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del.Supr.,
681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (1996); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1270, 1288
(1994). In Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (2001), the Court overturned the Chancery Court
judgment in favor of the board defendants based on the corporate charter’s exculpatory clause. The Court
characterized the shareholder’s claim regarding the merger price as properly pleading an entire fairness
claim. Id. at 88. The Court rejected the board’s argument that it was protected from even entire fairness
failures under section 102(b)(7). Id.
71
__ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.
72
Id. at 1.
73
Id. at 3.
74
Id. at 3.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id. at 5.
77
Id. at 6.
78
Id. at 8-9.
79
Id. at 1. The suit was brought in January 1997 by several shareholders alleging breaches of fiduciary
duty and contract and waste of assets. Id. The litigation was extended and involved several pretrial
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In a lengthy opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court tackled the intersection between the
business judgment rule and Section 102(b)(7).80 The court stressed that the presumption
of the business judgment rule can be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.”81 In such cases,
according to the Court, “the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate
that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its
shareholders.”82 Because no duty of loyalty breach was claimed against the directors, the
only way to rebut the business judgment rule, according to the Court, was to “show that
the Disney defendants had either breached their duty of care or had not acted in good
faith.”83 Moreover, building upon its holding in Emerald Partners v. Berlin,84 the Court
explained that an examination of a board’s lack of good faith can be made: (1) for
purposes of rebutting the business judgment rule; and (2) if the board is found liable, for
purposes of exculpation under section 102(b)(7).85
This section will not review in detail every claim that the shareholders made on appeal.
It will look closer at three specific areas that the Court grappled with and that are likely to
impact the treatment of executive compensation decisions in the future. One category
focuses on the reach of In re Walt Disney’s concept of the duty of care and how a
corporation can insulate itself from complaints under that basis. A second category
involves good faith as an element to avoid exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) and as a
grounds to rebut the business judgment rule in general. In this category, the key question
is whether the board’s decision-making regarding the executive compensation package
involved intentionally bad conduct or a “conscious[ ] and intentional[ ] disregard[ ][of]
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don't care about the risks' attitude,” 86 which would result
in a finding of bad faith, or, alternatively, whether gross negligence, which was found not
to be lacking in good faith. The third category focuses on complaints of excessive
compensation packages, like In re Walt Disney, as waste, where the payments at issue are
related to rational business attempts to attract executive talent.
a. Executive Compensation as a Duty of Care Element
After Section 102(b)(7)
The board of Trans Union in Van Gorkom made a decision to merge the company at a
motions and an earlier appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. See, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del.2000)(allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint). The trial lasted 37 days and resulted in a 174
page opinion by the Chancellor concluding that "the director defendants did not breach their fiduciary
duties or commit waste." In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 20566651, at 1 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005); --- A.2d ---- (Del.2005). The plaintiffs appealed from this judgment, claiming
numerous errors. __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466, at 1.
80
Id. at 15.
81
Id. at 15.
82
Id. at 15.
83
Id. at 15.
84
787 A.2d 85.
85
2006 WL 1562466, at 15. The business judgment rule can be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the
directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.” Id. (italics added).
86
2006 WL 1562466, at 24, 26, quoting 2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.).
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hastily called, brief board meeting with no formal documents or presentations. In doing
so, the board in Van Gorkom acted short of fulfilling its duty of care to act with informed
decision-making.87 Section 102(b)(7) was intended to limit the duty of care analysis
primarily to cases where there were also allegations of bad faith. Later cases, like
Emerald Partners, considered board decisions that also implicated duty of loyalty claims,
also not exculpable section 102(b)(7).88 Neither Van Gorkom nor Emerald Partners dealt
with the issue of shareholder allegations that a board acted without due care and in bad
faith in the absence of a duty of loyalty claim. By contrast, the In re Walt Disney Court
struggled with how to apply the duty of care analysis to board and committee decisionmaking in a compensation matter where shareholders alleged bad faith and the
corporation had a Section 102(b)(7) exculptatory provision.
It is important to note that general circumstances of In re Walt Disney are distinguishable
from Van Gorkom on a number of grounds. The Trans Union board’s decision to enter
into a merger agreement required board approval under Delaware statute.89 No decision
of the full Disney board of the OEA was required by statute. Furthermore, the board’s
decision-making authority was actually delegated to the compensation committee.90
Moreover, the court in Van Gorkom evaluated the action of the Trans Union board as a
collective group, whereas the action of the Disney directors was considered
individually.91 The decision of the Trans Union board concerned a merger, one of the
most important occurrences in the life of a corporation.92 In re Walt Disney concerned
an executive compensation matter.
Similarly the specific facts of In re Walt Disney are also distinguishable from Van
Gorkom in terms of the informed decision-making of: (1) the compensation committee
and board concerning the OEA; and (2) the board’s hiring Ovitz as President. Regarding
the compensation committee, although the Disney compensation committee did not have
a copy of the OEA when approved, the committee had a “term sheet” describing the NFT
provisions, which was attached to the meeting minutes.93 Furthermore, the committee
members were apprised of the potential value of the NFT.94 The committee reviewed
various spreadsheets that highlighted the “benchmarking” of the Ovitz options to prior
options the compensation committee had approved for other executives in order to give
the members a fair idea of the value in the event of NFT.95 The committee was also well
aware of the “downside” protection of $150 to $200 million that Ovitz was demanding
before leaving his company.96 Moreover, the committee’s failure to specifically discuss
the gross negligence and malfeasance event triggers of the NFT was not concerning
because “those terms ‘were not foreign to the board of directors, as the language was
87

488 A.2d 858.
787 A.2d 85, 93.
89
See 8 Del. C. § 251(b).
90
2006 WL 1562466, at 16.
91
Id. at 17.
92
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
93
2006 WL 1562466, at 18-19.
94
Id. at 19.
95
Id. at 19.
96
Id. at 20.
88
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standard, and could be found, for example, in Eisner's, Wells', Katzenberg's and Roth's
employment contracts.’”97 Finally, although the expert consultant was not present at the
compensation committee meeting, Crystal had worked on similar Disney agreements
before, met with some of the committee members prior to the meeting and was available
by telephone to answer questions.98 Only after receiving the information and
presentations and deliberating on the matter, did the compensation committee approve the
terms of the OEA.
While the deliberations of the Disney compensation committee fell short of “best
practices,”99 the deliberation process of the Trans Union board stands in sharp contrast.
In Van Gorkom, the meeting was called on short notice and there was no documentary
information for the Trans Union board to consider and little in terms of presentations.100
The management of Trans Union was opposed to the merger.101 After board approval of
the merger agreement, Van Gorkom revised the agreement in a manner inconsistent with
the board’s authorization.102 Finally, the Trans Union board did not have expert reports
that it could rely on and engaged in little deliberations.
Moreover, the facts surrounding the actions of the full board in the hiring of Ovitz as
President are also distinguishable from Van Gorkom. The Disney board had spent
substantial time over a course of several years debating the hiring of a new President and
the potential candidates, including Ovitz.103 The board was also aware that hiring Ovitz
would result in him leaving a highly successful company and that the market reacted
positively to Disney’s announcement that Ovitz would come to work with them.104
Finally, the board was aware of the compensation committee’s approval of the OEA and
received presentations regarding its terms.105
These distinctions make it possible to conclude that Van Gorkom and In re Walt Disney
are not inconsistent with each other. The Delaware Supreme Court did not rely
specifically on these distinctions, however, in writing its opinion and did not even cite
Van Gorkom.106 The main theme stressed was the requirement that a decision maker
become informed of material information reasonably available, not necessarily being
privy to all conversations and documents.107 Further, the Disney board members were
protected under 8 Del. C. § 141(e) for good faith reliance on the professional report
prepared by the compensation consultant, Crystal.108 While the Court generally
97

Id. at 20 (citing 2005 WL 2056651 at 9 n. 81).
2006 WL 1562466, at 21.
99
Id. at 19-20.
100
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-78.
101
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867-68.
102
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883-84.
103
Id. at 22.
104
Id. at 21-22.
105
Id. at 23.
106
While the Supreme Court did not cite Van Gorkom, the Delaware Chancery Court decision that the
Court affirmed cited Van Gorkom more than twenty times and specifically drew upon the distinctions
between the cases. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch.).
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2006 WL 1562466, at 21-22.
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Id. at 21.
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distinguished the type of informed board decision-making made by the Disney
compensation committee and board, it did not specifically rely on any of the other factual
distinctions between the two cases. Moreover, the theme of gross negligence strongly
emphasized in Van Gorkom was seemingly replaced by one that best practices are not
mandated to ensure business judgment rule protections.
In upholding the Court of Chancery’s decision on the due care issue in favor of the board
members and Ovitz actions concerning the OEA, the Court characterized the actions of
the Disney compensation committee as failing “best practices” from an informed
decision-making standpoint. A simple failure to exercise best practices is not below the
requisite exercise of due care, in contrast to the type of decision-making in Van
Gorkom.109 The true issue to be resolved, according to the Court, was whether the
compensation committee, when approving the OEA, and board, when appointing Ovitz as
President, were “were fully informed of all material facts.” 110 Yet, the court still retained
the general rule that board members should not be liable for due care errors in in the
absence of gross negligence.111
In re Walt Disney Co. raises the question of the reach of the gross negligence standard for
due care in the executive compensation context. How close to best practices must
compensation committees come? If courts define the due care obligation broadly,
executive compensation and employment decisions appear to require the same type of
information gathering, expert hiring and other processes used in more complicated
transactions, such as mergers. This seems particularly onerous in the differing contexts
of the life of a corporate enterprise. While in Van Gorkom, the board’s decision-making
related to a cash out merger that would end the life of Trans Union, no similar magnitude
of decision-making exists in the executive compensation arena of In re Walt Disney.
Despite the passage of section 102(b)(7), the Court’s extensive consideration of due care
obligations suggests that these obligations are alive and well. So, what is role of section
102(b)(7)?
b. The Emergence of a Good Faith Element
Much of the initial portion of the Court’s In re Walt Disney decision works over the due
care analysis in the executive compensation context. Disney, however, had a Section
102(b)(7) exculpation clause in its charter documents. Therefore, even if the plaintiffs
had prevailed on an informed decision-making claim, it would not be enough to impose
liability. To get around the section 102(b)(7) exculpation, the shareholders claimed the
compensation committee and board acted in bad faith. Much has been written about the
duty of good faith requirement arising under section 102(b)(7) prior to the decision In re
Walt Disney, but this was truly the Court’s opportunity to provide some guidance.112
109

2006 WL 1562466, at 18-19.
Id. at 22-23.
111
Id. at 17, 22.
112
For articles concerning the Disney litigation, see, e.g., Robert Baker, In Re Walt Disney: What It Means
To The Definition Of Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA.
ST. U. BUS. REV. 261 (2004-2005); Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith In Director
Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready To Force Corporate Directors To Go Out-Of-Pocket After Disney
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The efforts of the Court to clarify good faith under section 102(b)(7) are in the end
probably more confusing than illuminating without a clear factual application illustrating
bad faith. Most importantly, the Court emphasized that the duty of care and duty of good
faith were separate. Thus, the shareholders’ “effort to collapse the duty to act in good
faith into the duty to act with due care, is not unlike putting a rabbit into the proverbial
hat and then blaming the trial judge for making the insertion.”113 As the Court had
already concluded that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their duty of care arguments,
treating good faith in the same manner would not have changed the outcome on these
facts.114 The Court’s analysis could have ended here.
Nevertheless, the Court decided to address plaintiffs legal claims regarding good faith in
order to provide “some conceptual guidance to the corporate community.”115 The Court
classified corporate behavior as involving three categories of behaviors that could be
considered in the bad faith analysis.116 First, “subjective bad faith” where there is an
actual intent to harm that is shown to have occurred.117 This conduct would certainly
constitute bad faith for purposes of section 102(b)(7). Second, conduct that is simply a
lack of due care, gross negligence.118 This conduct, without more, would not constitute
bad faith for purposes of section 102(b)(7). To conclude otherwise, would eviscerate the
purpose of the statute.119 The third category of conduct is that which falls between the
first two. “[S]uch misconduct is properly treated as a non-exculpable, non-indemnifiable
IV?, 83 DENV. U.L.REV. 531 (2005). For a general discussion of the good faith exception to exculpation,
see, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L.REV. 456 (2004); Matthew R. Berry,
Does Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal Liability? Only if Delaware
Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L.REV.. 1125 (2004); John L. Reed and Matt Neiderman, Good
Faith and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Law as a Defense to
Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary
Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (Hereinafter
“Griffith”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1
(2005); Filippo Rossi, Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court's Triad of Fiduciary Duties (June 22,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755784 (last visited July 18, 2006); Christopher M. Bruner,
“Good Faith,” State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832944 (last visited
July 19, 2006); Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism Threatening the
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW, 1 (2005)
113
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Id. at 24.
115
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Id. at 25-26. The Court also concluded that the Delaware indemnification statute also supported a
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violation of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”120
The Court included in this category of bad faith the conduct described in the Delaware
Chancery Court opinion as a “conscious[ ] and intentional[ ] disregard[ ][of]
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don't care about the risks' attitude . . . .” 121 Quite
naturally, the duty of good faith should “protect the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders” from conduct that “does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined)
but is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence . . . .”122 Furthermore, section
102(b)(7) itself distinguishes misconduct that is intentional from conduct that is not in
good faith, though both are non-exculpable.123
Questions about good faith remain unaddressed in the wake of the Court's decision. The
holding places deliberate bad intent by corporate boards and grossly negligent conduct at
the opposite ends of the good faith continuum. On the other hand, the Court gives limited
guidance of where on that continuum specific types of board behavior fall. For instance,
behavior that may involve the exact type of risk taking expected by shareholders. If there
is a potential that courts will classified this behavior as bad faith, boards may become risk
averse to the detriment of shareholders. Further, the Court specifically did not determine
the limits of the final category of fiduciary conduct. “To engage in an effort to craft . . .
‘a definitive and categorical definition of the universe of acts that would constitute bad
faith’ would be unwise . . . .”124 Most importantly, the Court did not “reach or otherwise
address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty that, like the
duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent basis for imposing liability upon
corporate officers and directors.” 125 The Court left open that allegations of bad faith
could be a separate claim against boards and committees, such as the compensation
committee that approved the OEA.126 These questions and others that remain unresolved
in the wake of In re Walt Disney. It has been left to the lower courts to struggle with
some of these issues regarding application of the duty of care and good faith analysis.
c. Executive Compensation as Waste
120

2006 WL 1562466, at 26.
2006 WL 1562466, at 24, 26, quoting 2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.).
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The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care
and loyalty, in the narrow sense that I have discussed them above, but all actions required
by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary
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corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
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faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most salient.
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The third category of cases where executive compensation packages may be actionable
arises where board or committee decision-making may not involve a lack of informed
decision-making, but the payment to the executive nevertheless constitutes waste. The
Court of Chancery dismissed the shareholders’ waste claim initially. 127 The Delaware
Supreme Court allowed the shareholders to amend the complaint, but emphasized that
“waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately
small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade.”128 In fact, “[i]t is the essence of business judgment for a board to determine if “a
‘particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money, whether in the form of current
salary or severance provisions.’ ” 129 The clear conclusion to be drawn from the Court is
that it is assuming the board’s authority over the decision-making is broadly protected by
the business judgment rule unless there is no “rational business purpose” for the
decision.130 To overcome this inference, a proper challenge to payments to an executive
such as Ovitz would be “whether the amounts required to be paid in the event of an NFT
were wasteful ex ante;” either the payment was not required by contract with the
executive at all or was wasteful when entered into by the company.131
In re Walt Disney involves a fact pattern demonstrating that corporate boards have wide
discretion in making large executive compensation payments without triggering liability
for waste. For instance, at the time the payments were made to Ovitz, Disney was
contractually obligated to pay Ovitz the NFT payments under the OEA.132 The board,
therefore, is protected from a waste claim unless the OEA itself was wasteful.133 An
example of this kind of agreement would have been if the shareholders could have proved
that the OEA itself “incentivized Ovitz to perform poorly in order to obtain payment of
the NFT provisions.”134 The OEA, however, was designed to financially incentivize
Ovitz to leave his prior company and join Disney.135 There was certainly no evidence
that Ovitz had sought to intentionally get himself fired, a claim the Court rejected as
“fanciful.”136 Finally, at the time Disney exercised the NFT provisions, the board
members believed that Disney would be better off without Ovitz, but that termination for
cause was not an option.137
In re Walt Disney solidifies the Court’s prior rulings on waste concluding that “[a] claim
of waste will arise only in the rare, “unconscionable case where directors irrationally
127

Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
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squander or give away corporate assets.”138 Because of the wide discretion given to
boards in compensation matters, waste is not likely to be a successful claim for
shareholders unhappy about a board’s decisions and will not result in much, if any, legal
oversight over compensation matters.
III. The Benefits of the SEC’s Disclosure Approach to Executive Compensation
The Proposed Regulations contain extensive provisions designed to improve the SEC's
ability to ensure that shareholders have a “more complete picture of the compensation
earned by a company’s principal executive officer, principal financial officer and highest
paid executive officers and members of its board of directors.”139 The Proposed
Regulations would not only strengthen the existing disclosure system by expanding the
format for and types of executive compensation information covered, but also address
more fully “key financial relationships among companies and their executive officers,
directors, significant shareholders and their respective immediate family members.”140
The SEC intends the Proposed Regulations to enhance the strengths of the current
reporting system, rather than forging ahead in a different direction.141
Disclosure of executive compensation issues raises complex questions. What should the
SEC include in compensation? When was compensation paid to an executive? How was
the compensation paid? How and when should compensation be valued? How can the
format of disclosure provide meaningful data that the public can use for comparative
purposes? The SEC has attempted to address the breadth of these issues in the Proposed
Regulations, sometimes with more success and clarity for some items than for others.
A. Compensation Discussion and Analysis Will Explain Compensation Policy
One of the major improvements contained in the Proposed Regulations is the new
requirement of a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) narrative intended to
relay “material factors underlying compensation policies and decisions” related to the
information set forth in the required tables.142 Simplified, the CD&A would give context
to the tabular disclosure and explain material elements of the company’s compensation
relative to the named executives, including: (1) the objectives of the compensation
program; (2) the actions the company rewards through the compensation program; (3) the
individual elements included in the compensation program; (4) the rationale supporting
particular elements of the compensation program; (5) the reasoning behind the amounts
chosen for each element; and (6) how the choices surrounding the elements fit with the
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Id., at 33 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
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compensation objectives as a whole.143 The SEC intends the CD&A not to be a
“boilerplate” discussion. 144 For this reason, compliance with the Proposed Regulations
could have a substantial impact on companies by requiring them for the first time to set
out compensation policies in a detailed manner.
B. Compensation Tables Will Provide Important Disclosure of Perquisites and
Stealth Retirement Compensation
Along with the CD&A, the revisions to the compensation tables are significant in terms
of the amount of disclosure that will be made to the public.145 The compensation tables
themselves would include expanded disclosure for: (1) executive compensation for the
last fiscal year, including deferred compensation; (2) equity related interests relating to
compensation; and (3) retirement and post employment compensation and benefits.146
The revisions are intended to provide more clarity to the presentation by organizing
disclosure around “themes,” while confirming that companies must disclose all elements
of executive compensation.147 For instance, the Summary Compensation Table
contemplated by the Proposed Regulations requires companies to disclose compensation
of named executive officers for the last three years, 148 including a total compensation
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Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6545. For instance, a company would include in its CD&A
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Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6546.
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column intended to require disclosure in a single number of aggregate amounts of
compensation of all types.149 Moreover, the “all other compensation” column includes a
number of important disclosure items, including perquisites and personal benefits,150 but
is limited to avoid disclosure of items that are de minimus (less than $10,000 in the
aggregate).151 This will discourage companies from using perquisites, retirement
benefits, lucrative severanace packages and other compensation in a means to avoid
public disclosure of compensation, what some have termed “stealth compensation.”152
Finally, the Proposed Regulations also tackle the large amounts corporations pay to
executives in the form of retirement, or like in the case of Ovitz, post employment
payments. 153
2006)(explaining that the “all other compensation” figure may be quite large for some companies and that
breakdown is necessary for clarity).
149
Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547-48.
150
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Compensation, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. at 140-41; Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. at 854-56. Finally,
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C. Other Disclosures and Modifications Will Help Provide a Clearer Picture of
Executive Compensation Practices
Further, the Proposed Regulations also add new disclosure requirements and strengthen
some existing disclosure. First, the Proposed Regulations contemplate compensation
disclosure for the three most highly compensated employees who earn more than the
executive officers or directors, but who are not themselves executive officers.154 Second,
the SEC believes that a table disclosing director compensation in a format similar to the
Summary Compensation Table for executives is also in order because of the emergence
of more complicated director compensation packages that often include company stock
and incentive plans.155 Finally, the Proposed Regulations take the stance that executive
compensation is also linked to financial transactions between companies and their
directors and significant shareholders, warranting disclosure.156
D. Filing of the Disclosure will Create Liability for Misstatements
Importantly, under the current rules, the Compensation Committee “furnishes” to the
SEC a required “Compensation Committee Report and Performance Graph” which does
not create potential liability under the 1933 Act or Exchange Act.157 The Report and
Performance Graph are eliminated under the Proposed Regulations.158 Under the
Proposed Regulations, the CD&A, tables and accompanying narrative will be considered
“soliciting material” and will be “filed” with the SEC.159 The effect is that the disclosure
154

Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6544. This requirement has been criticized particularly by those
companies in the entertainment industry as onerous, an invasion of privacy of entertainers and unrelated to
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http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jrich7010.pdf (last visited July 12, 2006); Comment of Steve
Odland, Business Roundtable, at 2, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 12, 2006); Comment of
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of executive compensation information will be a company report certified by the
executives, rather than just furnished by the compensation committee of the board.160
This change would now create liability for misstatements under the Exchange Act for
every company that is subject to the rules.
The filing of the information will result in more executive involvement in compensation
matters and particularly how they are disclosed.161 There is no reason to believe, though,
that executive involvement in this disclosure aspect of compensation matters will affect
compensation committee decision-making at the time the compensation is approved. The
SEC is convinced that company responsibility over the disclosure of board matters as a
filed item in this instance is the means to ensure full disclosure.
With all this information disclosure, what impact will the Proposed Regulations actually
have on executive compensation decision-making? Will the shareholders have remedies
for excessive executive compensation?
IV.

Why the Proposed Regulations Won’t Fix Excessive Compensation:
Consequences of Dual Regulation

Information disclosure is important and helpful to the investing public. Finalizing the
Proposed Regulations alone, though, will not accomplish the task of making corporate
decision-makers accountable for compensation decisions. Since its formation, the SEC’s
mission has been focused on the disclosure of accurate information to the public. The
SEC will undoubtedly engage in involved review of information submitted by companies.
The SEC will not, and has not been, however, in the business of merit-review of
executive compensation. Nevertheless, Chairman Cox is hoping “that when people are
forced to undress in public, they’ll pay more attention to their figures.”162
The SEC acts as a repository for financial and other data on executive compensation.
Aside from material misstatements contained in filed information, SEC involvement ends
after filing. Sifting through the data will be a task for investors, and particularly,
institutional investors. While it may be possible for the investing public to rise to this
challenge, much depends on whether the public will be motivated and able to curb
perceived abuses. SEC disclosure mandates for executive compensation disclosure have
been in place since 1938. While in 1940 half of the executives earned fifty-six times the
average worker’s pay, by 2004 the number increased to one hundred four times the
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average worker’s pay.163 If the past is any guide, improved transparency will not operate
as a check on the amount of executive compensation paid.164
Even if companies fully report and shareholders receive and are able to understand the
executive compensation data as more fully disclosed under the Proposed Regulations,
shareholders still confront serious obstacles. The SEC only regulates accurate disclosure.
The rest is left to state law. Let us assume the Proposed Regulations were in effect when
the Disney compensation committee approved the OEA. State law only controls whether
compensation decisions are made complying with due care procedures for informed
decision-making, in good faith, and are not wasteful. Even with the information that the
Proposed Regulations would have required Disney to disclose to the shareholders about
the OEA, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that that the OEA was approved with
due care, in good faith and was not wasteful.165 This leaves a gap between information
disclosure and the shareholder’s ability to hold decision-makers accountable for
compensation packages that the shareholders perceive to be excessive. Unfortunately,
the fundamental problem with executive compensation decision-making is not as simple
as information disclosure. There are the lingering issues of accountability and
shareholders’ ability to react to the information. Is the only goal of the Proposed
Regulations to provide shareholders information prior to purchasing shares?
The SEC’s focus on expanded disclosure of executive compensation information -excessive or otherwise-- will undoubtedly have consequences for executive
compensation.166 Companies may change policies away from certain compensation
elements that must be disclosed to ones that are more useful and link pay to
performance.167 Disclosure will not fully address the issues of executive compensation
for a number of reasons. First, compensation decisions raise issues of arms-length
dealing and managerial influence over the compensation process. Second, shareholders
desiring to respond to the enhanced information disclosure may find they have little
recourse beyond selling their shares, which is not always a viable alternative. Third, the
ability of shareholders to challenge board decisions on compensation issues directly or by
removing directors is limited, suggesting that accountability is lacking. Finally, while
disclosure is an important regulatory mechanism, it is not substantive regulation. This
section will discuss some of the reasons that collectively impact why the Proposed
Regulations are not likely to have significant effect on board decision-making involving
executive compensation.
163

Eric Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, p.

1.

164

In fact, one poll of human resources consulting firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide concluded that most
American companies did not plan to change their programs. See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could
Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, p. 1. In the past, every time that the SEC has
mandated additional disclosure, executive pay has actually increased. Id. at p. 10.
165
2006 WL 1562466.
166
See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec.
3, p. 1(discussing Lucian Bebchuk’s prediction that companies may change compensation packages to
more useful elements once public disclosure reaches some of the formerly hidden elements).
167
See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec.
3, p. 10(discussing Lucian Bebchuk’s prediction that companies may change compensation packages to
more useful elements once public disclosure reaches some of the formerly hidden elements).

THE HOUSE OF MOUSE AND BEYOND

27

A. Compensation Decisions May Be Different from Other Board Decisions
State law vests the corporate board with decision making for the company, to which the
business judgment rule give protections, subject to the duties of care and loyalty.168 Not
all decisions that a corporate board makes, however, are treated the same in terms of the
extent of judicial review and degree of protection by the business judgment rule. Plenty
of examples exist, though they tend to fall into two categories of decisions: (i) where the
board’s independent decision-making is questioned and (ii) where the impact on the
company will fundamentally affect the way in which the company will continue.
With respect to the first category, in Delaware, for instance, pre-suit demand on the board
by shareholders in deritivative actions is excused when “futile” due to doubt about the
board disinterestedness or independence and doubt about whether the business judgment
rule affords protection.169 The rationale is that sometimes the board is “incapable, due to
personal interest or domination and control, of objectively evaluating a shareholder
demand, if made,” and thereby exercising the board’s decision-making authority for the
corporation.170 In a takeover situation, a board’s decision to institute defensive tactics
must be supported by a reasonable response to the threat posed since the takeover context
presents the "omnipresent specter" that a board will act in its own best interests, rather
than the shareholders’ interests.171 Similarly, in the parent-subsidiary context where the
board’s independence is questioned because the parent dominates the board, board
decisions are subjected to a higher standard of scrutiny if there is evidence of self
dealing.172 As another example, board decisions are subjected to heightened scrutiny in
parent-subsidiary mergers where there is evidence that the transaction was not negotiated
at arms-length.173
With respect to the second category, there are some decisions which cannot be made by
the board alone due to the affect on the company as an ongoing entity. For instance, the
following decisions require the board to submit the matter to the shareholders after board
vote: (i) approval of mergers;174 (ii) approval of amendments to the certificate of
incorporation;175 and (iii) approval of certain business combinations involving interested
shareholders.176 Additionally, shareholders can propose amendments to the company’s
bylaws by their own initiative.177
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Compensation decisions share some of the characteristics of both categories of decision.
With respect to the first category where the board’s independence might be in doubt, it is
easy to question whether corporate boards bargain at arms-lengths with executives over
compensation matters and remain faithful to shareholder interests.178 Recent empirical
work by Professors Randall Martin and Stewart Schwab examining the contracts of CEOs
concluded that “CEOs have significant bargaining power in their negotiations over the
terms of their employment contracts and change-in-control agreements.”179
A number of questions exist regarding the board’s ability to engage in arms-length
contracting with CEOs. First, directors may be motivated to make arrangements
favorable to executives out of “collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict
within the board team, and sometimes friendship and loyalty . . . .”180 Second, directors
might not have enough time, resources or connection to a company themselves through
stock ownership and otherwise to take on the difficult and sometimes unpleasant job of
tough negotiations with a current or future executive over compensation.181 Third, board
members might certainly be motivated by a desire to be reelected to the board. 182
Reelection requires a board member to be nominated to the company slate.183
Nomination, typically by a nominating committee, is often heavily influenced by the
same executives whose compensation the board members approve.184 Fourth, the ability
of the executives to benefit the directors through director compensation packages,
charitable giving and other business dealings with companies with which the director is
associated suggest a picture of entangled interests.185 Finally, the “managerial power”
approach asserts simply that powerful executives are able to receive higher compensation
packages less sensitive to performance from corporate boards.186
178

See, e.g., Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 23-44; Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of
William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30
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note 1, at 15-17.
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 4. See also, Kenneth West, Pay Without Performance: An
Executive’s Perspective, 30 J. CORP. L. at 792-93; Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE,
June 30, 2006 (reporting the findings of a PricewaterhouseCoopers poll that boards are having trouble
controlling the size of executive compensation).
181
Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 4.
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and that reelection depends on what management and the other directors think, making it uncomfortable to
push a CEO).
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 27-30.
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 5; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (the "managerial
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The connection to the second category of decisions impacting the way in which the
company will continue is present, but seems not as strong. Although executive
compensation decisions are often “material” ones to the company, the expenditure
doesn’t typically amount to a large amount of the companies’ total assets.187
Nevertheless, companies expect CEOs to have a great impact on the company’s future
prospects and measure CEO success in terms of company stock performance, earnings
growth, cost reduction, etc. Further, even the decision to hire a particular executive can
have substantial effect on the market price for company stock. When Disney hired Ovitz,
for instance, the release of the news caused the Disney stock price to jump 4.4% in a
single day.188
These reasons suggest that executive compensation decisions present issues that may
distinguish them from other, more routine, board decisions. Whereas we can expect the
board to negotiate at arms length in many situations, executive compensation decisions
have characteristics of other areas in corporate governance where decision-making is
normally subjected to additional processes or higher standards of review. Further, there
are indices that even corporate managers and the corporate community have long
perceived that compensation decisions are distinguishable from routine decision-making
by: (1) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing rules that require companies to have a
compensation committee composed of “independent directors” which operate under a
written charter describing the responsibilities of the committee;189 (2) hiring
compensation consultants, preparation of spreadsheets and similar documents; and (3)
power approach" explains board deviance from optimal executive compensation packages due to the
board’s influence by or sympathy to the executives). For a critical discussion of the managerial power
approach used to explain the rise in executive compensation, see Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the
CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003). ); Michael Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30
IOWA J. CORP. L. 255 (2005)(concluding that managerial power affects director’s decisions to give higher
compensation packages to executives). A Watson Wyatt Worldwide survey of directors and institutional
investors found that while only forty-eight percent of directors think that executives heavily influence
executive pay decisions, eighty-seven percent of institutional investors believe executives heavily influence
the process. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive Pay Model Mixed Reviews,
Watson Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (last visited July 18, 2006).
187
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 260. See also, Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the
Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U.PA.L.REV. 1205, 1235 (1999)
(arguing that “[e]xecutive compensation makes up such a small percentage of a firm's assets that even
excessive pay packages will likely not cause a blip in a firm's stock value.”); cf. id. (contrasting executive
compensation with decisions by a company's board regarding takeovers, which have a great effect on a
company's stock price).
188
2006 WL 1562466, at 5.
189
See, New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, P 303A.05, available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/lcm/1078416930957.html?enable=section&n
umber=3&ssnumber=303a.00 (last visited August 7, 2006) [hereinafter NYSE]. See also, National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Inc., Marketplace Rules, IM 4350(c),
available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=18 (last
visited August 7, 2006)(rules require compensation decisions to be approved or recommended to the board
by a compensation committee or independent board members)[hereinafter NASDAQ].
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spending increasing amounts of board and committee time on executive compensation
matters.190 If board decisions regarding compensation are distinguishable from other
routine decisions, the regulatory response might also entail more than business judgment
review and disclosure.
While it seems likely that the Proposed Regulations and Existing Regulations would have
required disclosure of the OEA, disclosure does not consider the relationships that make
executive compensation decisions different from routine board matters. These concerns
are summed up by Professor Lucian Bebchuk: “The factors impeding arm’s length
contracting are in part a product of legal rules and corporate practices. With the rules and
practices that we have had to date, directors have been subject to a myriad of incentives
and forces that have prevented them from bargaining at arm’s length with the CEO over
pay.”191 The effectiveness of information disclosure hinges on the effect that disclosure
will have on decision makers. Adding more disclosure is unlikely to enhance arm’s
length dealings here.
B. The Gap: Performance of the Board’s Duty of Care and Good Faith
Obligations Will Permit Some Excessive Compensation Packages
Another challenge facing the SEC is the gap existing between disclosure and state law
regulation of executive compensation decision-making. State law creates accountability
for only some executive compensation decisions. Excessive compensation packages are
not necessarily the product of a lack of due care, bad faith or waste. An important
category of excessive executive compensation packages are those adopted in accordance
with state law duties, and perhaps even with “best practices.”192 The OEA was adopted
with due care, in good faith and was not waste, yet some shareholders were outraged
enough to litigate the matter for years.193
The “best practices” described by the Delaware Supreme Court for executive
compensation decision-making might help, but won’t prevent excessive packages.194
First, the compensation committee members should receive (preferably in advance of the
meeting) a spreadsheet or document prepared by a compensation expert disclosing the
amounts the executive might receive under various alternatives.195 Second, the
compensation expert or a committee member should explain the spreadsheet or document
to the committee with the document being an exhibit to committee minutes.196 Finally,
the committee members would then have deliberations and discussion.197 The In re Walt
Disney Court observed that following this “tidy” process will eliminate the basis for
litigation.198
190

See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466, at 18 (discussing the “best practices” for compensation matters).
Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 43.
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See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466, at 18 (discussing the “best practices” for compensation matters).
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Best practices from Disney are likely to be adopted by companies, but will not
prevent excessive compensation packages. The exercise of best practices
contemplates a board or committee using procedural safeguards, not substantive
ones. If a compensation decision is later challenged by shareholders, state law
only considers the procedural due care employed by the board or committee and
does not involve a substantive review of compensation decisions.199 So long as
procedural measures are employed, shareholders will have no basis to litigate. A
problem that shareholders face, therefore, is that while the Proposed Regulations
may aid in the discovery of excessive compensation packages, this limit on state
law remedies creates a gap where excessive packages will remain.
C. Shareholders Lack Meaningful Ability to Challenge Board Decisions
Even if the Proposed Regulations operate as intended to trigger additional company
disclosure they will not be effective because shareholders do not have much of a role in
establishing executive compensation packages and little ability to challenge decisions
afterwards.200 We count on corporate boards to make decisions for the company.
Accountability, though, is key to policing board decision-making. For instance,
shareholders unhappy with board decision-making over executive compensation matters
often have little ability to oust directors in a proxy contest or hostile takeover, since such
contests are rare.201 Furthermore, shareholders cannot rely on state law to eliminate
excessive packages because board compliance with the law does not eliminate excessive
packages, discussed supra.
It might be argued that aggrieved shareholders displeased with compensation policies can
simply sell their shares. This would only affect corporate policy if enough shareholders
were to sell shares in response to compensation policy. Not all shareholders, for instance
ones with indexed investmetns, can simply readjust investments. Furthermore, to the
extent excessive compensation practices are widespread, selling may not operate as a
check on the market.202 In fact, few shareholdes actually sell in response to unhappiness
with compensation policies.203 For these reasons, the option of selling seems to be a
weak check on compensation policy.
199

Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec.
3, p. 10. For a discussion of the challenges facing shareholders, see, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin,
Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 613 (2001).
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11; Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001)(proxy contests
of this sort are rare and expensive).
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Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 25-26 (this could result in a
shareholder having to leave the market entirely); Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (even institutional
shareholders may not have the portfolio flexibility in order to simply sell all shares). See also, See Robert
B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to "Just Say
No," 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 999 (1999).
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In practice, affirmative shareholder initiatives objecting to executive compensation
(mostly unsuccessful) have mostly centered on three areas: (i) suing the board under state
law;204 (ii) voting against employee stock option plans;205 and (iii) putting forward
shareholder precatory resolutions under Rule 14a-8 of the federal proxy rules.206
Derivative suits are constrained by the due care, good faith and waste analyses, which are
procedural inquiries that limit shareholder ability to object compensation packages that
are excessive on a substantive level.207 Furthermore, one must question whether courts
are in the best situation to evaluate the merits of executive compensation plans.208
Shareholder voting on employee stock option plans has not been an effective restraint on
executive compensation. Shareholders typically vote on a plan as a whole, not with
respect to how the plan rewards a particular executive in the future.209 Finally,
shareholder precatory resolutions on executive compensation matters, even when
effectively framed such that widespread support is possible, only have a limited impact
on board decision-making because they are purely advisory.210
The less successful experience of American shareholders attempts to affect management
decision-making might be distinguished from that of European company shareholders. In
many European companies, five or ten shareholders own substantial stakes in many
companies. With the ownership more concentrated, these larger shareholders are more
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See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466. See, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 45.
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Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 51-52; Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive
Compensation, supra note 1, at 26 (noting the limited effect shareholders can have with precatory
resolutions); Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in
Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001) (these proposals typically get less than ten percent of the
vote); Brownstein and Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority
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able to take their complaints to management and get a response.211 Even for smaller
stakeholders, strong European initiatives aimed at disclosure to shareholders in advance
of board meetings, coupled with shareholder rights to challenge resolutions not properly
disclosed, offer protections.212 It might be observed, though, that the ability of larger
shareholders in European companies to impact management decisions might also
adversely affecting the rights of minority shareholders in the same company.213
The SEC has identified a strategy for dealing with excessive compensation: “to help
investors keep an eye on how much of their money is being paid to the top executives
who work for them.”214 Given the obstacles to challenging compensation decisions,
American shareholders, who often do not have substantial stakes in any individual
corporation, find it difficult to achieve changes in corporate policy. The Proposed
Regulations will provide the shareholders information, but reacting to it will be
troublesome. Although this approach is laudable, it does not suggest or entail
accountability. Chairman Cox has explained “the SEC lacks statutory authority to
impose salary caps on corporate executives and we'd be out of bounds to attempt that
through indirection.”215 Without holding corporate decision makers accountable to the
shareholders, however, the Proposed Regulations will be not change much in the world of
executive compensation.
D. Disclosure of Compensation Information in a Transparent Format is Critical
but is Not Enough
Yet another problem facing the SEC is that disclosure is not the equivalent of merit
211

See, Rafael LaPorta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999)(presents
empirical evidence illustrating the different corporate ownership patterns). See also, e.g., High Level
Group of Co. Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe 59-60 (2002), available at
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review or substantive regulation of conduct. Some believe, for instance, that the
increased disclosure requirements anticipated by the Proposed Regulations will actually
result in new increases in executive compensation levels.216 New surveys indicate that
most companies will not change compensation policies in response to the Proposed
Regulations.217
The benefit to the public of having full access in a fully transparent way to executive
compensation policies, practices and data cannot be understated.218 Brandeis’ oft-quoted
statement "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman" is appropriate here.219 Transparency, if achieved, certainly will have an
effect on the ability of executives to receive executive compensation packages that are
less coupled to performance.220 Disclosure makes sure that all investors have access to
compensation information prior to making an investment.221 It is widely believed that
access to understandable financial data even by the market professionals alone would
result in the data being reflected in the pricing of the stock.222 Reflection of information
in stock prices and opening access to information prior to investment, though, is not the
same as providing accountability for decision-making or changing compensation policies
or processes to protect an investment once made.223 Should we employ a regulatory
approach for executive compensation that is predominately dependent on investor choice
at the purchase stage? What about information overload, overconfidence in one’s ability
to decipher information, optimism and other barriers to disclosure based regulation?224
216

Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 1
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The SEC has often turned its focus to disclosure based regulations,225 rather than merit
review or substantive regulation, under the belief that the market assumes that investors
make informed decisions with full disclosure.226 As an example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) contains substantive prohibitions against certain corporate
behavior. Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley is intended "to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . .
."227 The advantage of disclosure as a regulatory approach is that it serves as a less
invasive government intrusion into companies and allows investors to make their own
personal choices about investments.228 This theory fails to appreciate, first, that investors
don’t always make rational decisions in making an initial investment, and, second, that
investors need options other than selling in response to disclosure of information about
excessive compensation to executives. That is, not all investor behavior can fall neatly
into buy and sell decisions in response to information. Investors are vulnerable to
corporate misdealing not only from lack of information about executive compensation,
but limits on their decisions.229 Regulating conduct, rather than disclosure surely is more
complicated.230
Traditional SEC disclosure-focused programs can produce results in other areas, such as
making sure that the prospectus in an initial public offering that contains misstatements
creates liability for the issuer.231 Using the same approach for executive compensation
matters is not likely to yield the same meaningful results. For instance, information
overload is a problem with disclosure-based regulatory systems generally,232 but will
225
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particularly be a hurdle to investors understanding executive compensation disclosure.
The Proposed Regulations contemplate no less than eight complex graphs and extensive
narrative discussion.233 Additionally, the SEC is attempting to avoid “boilerplate”
disclosure of compensation information with the Proposed Regulations.234 Because
lawyers draft much of documents filed with the SEC, 235 boilerplate will be almost
impossible to eliminate with the Proposed Regulations. Further, most of the disclosure
contemplated by the Proposed Regulations will be received after executive compensation
decisions are made, which does not provide existing shareholders with meaningful
options other than selling their shares.
Moreover, although the Proposed Regulations create liability for misstatements, this does
not mean that the SEC is undertaking merit review of executive compensation decisions.
In fact, Chairman Cox specifically said that the SEC is not in the business of setting
compensation or evaluating compensation decisions.236 Nevertheless, Chairman Cox is
clearly hoping that fuller disclosure will result in changes to executive compensation
policies and programs.237 Unfortunately, Chairman Cox’ intention may not be realizable
in light of the following realities: (1) most companies don’t plan to change their
practices;238 (2) most directors don’t believe that the current executive compensation
approach is flawed;239 (3) the board’s role as an independent decision maker is
compromised;240 (4) the gap between state and federal regulation of state law results
allows some excessive compensation packages to exist;241 and (5) shareholders lack the
ability to attack compensation plans they perceive as excessive.242 As a result, the
Proposed Regulations may not have the level of impact that the SEC and the public want.
Hours?, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at A12; Kimberly Strassell, The Weekend Interview with Christopher
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impenetrable to all but whiz kid financial analysts”).
233
Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6548, 6556, 6559-62, 6565 (The following tables are
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Executive compensation presents a difficult situation for regulators. The Proposed
Regulations would require companies to disclose substantial amounts of compensation
data, but to what result? Many directors believe that disclosure of increased
compensation information is a positive change because it will demonstrate that the
existing pay system works.243 Sometimes direct regulation of conduct is more effective
to deter fraud or bad practices.244 Professor Charles Elson sums it up: “[d]isclosure is
like an aspirin; it can make you feel a little better, but it can’t even cure the common cold
. . . . The fact is, a board that overpays the C.E.O. is in all probability not minding the
store on other issues either.”245 For these reasons, disclosure regulatory programs are
unlikely to enjoy widespread impact on compensation policies with more stringent
regulation.
At this juncture, the SEC has not been fully candid about the limitations of solely
continuing an information disclosure regulatory approach. As Representative Barney
Frank commented:
[T]he proposed rule is an excellent first step, and I hope we can work
together to ensure that shareholders have the tools needed to address
executive compensation and corporate governance as they see fit. For a
market to work, however, participants require information; and choice.
This proposed rule would give shareholders valuable information relating
to executive compensation, but does not give them much hope for doing
anything about it. Short of shaming boards into holding executives
accountable, the proposed rule does not ensure that shareholders can
effectively change compensation practices.246
Of course, even if the SEC does not pursue additional regulation now, corporations have
no assurances that this policy would continue. The SEC, particularly in the event of a
243
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mandate by Congress or in the wake of another corporate scandal, could easily change its
mind at a later date.247 The SEC's assertion of only informational jurisdiction over
executive compensation as part of its core mission leaves much undone with the gap
existing between the SEC’s information disclosure and the In re Walt Disney expression
of shareholder recourse for excessive compensation. Without more marked changes, the
Proposed Regulations aren’t likely to have significant impact on compensation decisions
or practices.
V.

Filling the Gap between In Re Walt Disney and Disclosure

The gap between the disclosure required by the Proposed Regulations and the procedural
review contemplated by In re Walt Disney could be filled with three different
approaches: (1) federal legislation, including amending the Exchange Act or SarbanesOxley to alter the corporate governance framework; (2) state legislation, including
enhancements of shareholder control over approval of executive compensation packages;
or (3) corporate self-regulation, such as enhanced listing requirements by SROs. These
alternatives each raise issues with the appropriate role of regulators balanced against the
preference for the market to operate freely. This section will examine some of the
possible solutions in each of these approaches and evaluate their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
A. Federal Interest in Regulation of Executive Compensation
The Proposed Regulations ask corporations to disclose executive compensation
information to the public; if disclosed appropriately, that is the end of the SEC’s
involvement. Nevertheless, the federal government has demonstrated that it can make
greater intrusions in the traditionally state realm of corporate governance beyond
disclosure. For instance, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), represents federal
involvement, through the SEC, in corporate governance through the FCPA’s prohibitions
on bribery of and other certain payments to foreign officials by corporations and
recordkeeping requirements.248
More recently, the federal government again demonstrated that it will enter corporate
governance in response to scandal. Sarbanes-Oxley regulates corporate conduct, in
addition to containing disclosure requirements. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley grants to
the SEC of authority with respect to matters of board composition and committee
structure.249 The SEC can also prohibit through administrative, rather than court,
247
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proceedings, executives from serving as corporate officers.250 Importantly, SarbanesOxley takes a shot at executive compensation by prohibiting most types of loans to
company executives.251 Additionally, the CEO and CFO must return bonuses, incentives
and equity based compensation and certain profits from the sale of securities if the
corporation has to file an accounting restatement due to misconduct.252 Sarbanes-Oxley
also prohibits directors and executive officers of issuers from trading in any equity
securities of the issuer during any employee fund blackout period.253
The Exchange Act grants to the SEC wide authority over Self-Regulated Organization
("SRO") rules, including the power to approve or disapprove rule changes and to
unilaterally change SRO rules,254 so long as the SEC is acting "in furtherance of the
purposes of the Exchange Act."255 Because Sarbanes-Oxley greatly expanded the SEC’s
authority over corporate governance matters under the Exchange Act, the SEC may find
that it has increased ability to use listing rules to regulate corporate governance matters
generally and executive compensation specifically.256
One issue yet to be mentioned is whether there is any potential for further federal
involvement in executive compensation regulation.257 To remedy remaining abuses, the
SEC could attempt to use its Sarbanes-Oxley authority to regulate compensation
committees or shareholder involvement in compensation decisions, perhaps using its
authority over SRO listing rules.258 As Professor Roberta Karmel has observed: “the
SEC is an agency with a very long institutional memory that has always acquired more
power in response to crisis and scandal, and the future use it may make of the additional
power it has acquired pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley is unknown.”259 Thus far, however,
the SEC has been discouraged by the business community (and the CEOs in particular)
from attempting more substantial reforms in the corporate governance area.260
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If outrage over executive compensation persists and the SEC is unable to react, however,
new federal law could result. In fact, the Protection Against Executive Compensation
Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, (H.R. 4291)261 was introduced in 2005. H.R. 4291 would amend
the Exchange Act to require specific disclosures of compensation figures that are subject
to shareholder votes approving compensation and golden parachute plans.262 H.R. 4291
would mandate executives to return to companies any compensation received: (1) that
was not approved by the shareholders; (2) where the executive does not meet the stated
job performance measures; (3) that is incentive compensation or bonuses received by the
executive “within 18 months before any negative material restatement by the issuer;” or
(4) that is “related to fraud or misrepresentation” by the executive.263
The main advantage of federal regulation of executive compensation is uniformity of
regulation across state lines, most likely under the Exchange Act. The SEC is already
involved in monitoring and reporting of many matters under the Exchange Act and
certainly could monitor compliance with new regulation in the area of executive
compensation. In fact, the SEC already has some involvement in executive compensation
through the existing loan prohibitions and other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Moreover, the SEC already has an enforcement apparatus available to sanction
corporations that do not comply fully.
Corporate governance has historically been a matter of state, not federal law, however.
For this reason, existing federal involvement in corporate governance is only sporadic,
not comprehensive. Nevertheless, the federal government clearly could regulate
executive compensation matters. One must question, though, whether expanding the
federal role is the optimal response. Because corporate governance in general is a matter
left to state law, the federal government does not seem to be the first line of defense for
reforming the specific area of corporate governance concerning compensation matters.
Reformation of executive compensation is better done in the context of the existing
corporate governance structure covering a variety of matters, which is set by state, not
federal, law. Federal government regulation of compensation seems to be a measure of
last resort. Of course, the SEC could work with state governments on this issue.
B. State Interest in Regulating Executive Compensation
The Supreme Court has observed that "[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."264 For this
reason, state courts and legislatures have a strong interest in regulating executive
compensation and are the most logical actors here. Quite simply, it is important that
261
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shareholders have tools to evaluate and respond to inefficient or excessive executive
compensation packages.265 The Proposed Regulations give shareholders substantial
disclosure for evaluation, which leaves remedy as the focus here. Potential state law
remedies to fill the gap between existing federal and state regulation of executive
compensation seem to fall in three general areas: (1) increased court review; (2)
shareholder approval of compensation arrangements; and (3) greater shareholder role in
the election of directors.
One state law alternative to fill the gap would be to simply treat executive compensation
decisions like other self-dealing transactions and submit them to a fairness review when
the issue is litigated.266 Although this would still require shareholders to litigate instances
of excessive compensation, raising the standard of review in litigation for such
transactions would arguably have the effect of: (1) increasing the likelihood of success in
excessive compensation cases; and (2) change the way in which compensation
committees make decisions. Similarly, courts could treat executive compensation
decisions as ones with demand futility automatically to overcome barriers to challenging
compensation decisions. Professors Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin have suggested
that courts could require companies to justify significant deviations from medial levels of
executive compensation:
[T]he strongest case in favor of courts looking closely at executive pay at
public corporations is that they are best positioned to police abuses of the
executive compensation process. . . . .
A more difficult argument can be made in favor of courts policing the
substance of outlier pay packages. This proposal is more likely to provoke
claims of judicial incapacity and overreaching. . . . While this change
would do little to stop the apparently inexorable rise in the levels of
executive pay over the last decade, it would give angry shareholders a
more direct method of challenging extraordinary pay packages.267
There is not much likelihood, however, that the courts or state legislatures will undertake
substantive review of compensation packages in this manner.268
Another way state legislatures could address the problem of executive compensation
would be to make directors more accountable to the shareholders for compensation
265
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decisions.269 State statutes already require shareholder approval of a number of board
decisions.270 The same statutes could also require shareholder approval (or even nonbinding review) of executive compensation agreements, or at least ones that include
specified features.271 Similarly, state law could allow shareholders to pass resolutions on
executive compensation policy that is binding on the board, rather than precatory.272 If
shareholders could act collectively, there is also the possibility of passing a corporate
bylaw related to executive compensation.273
The disadvantage of this accountability model is that it does not tackle the problem at the
decision-making level with the compensation committee.274 Moreover, it is uncertain
whether the shareholders as a group will be motivated to first, sift through the
voluminous disclosure contemplated by the Proposed Regulations, and second, react by
challenging corporate policy and decision makers.275 Further, having shareholders
undertake this role diverges from the concept of a corporate board responsible to manage
for shareholders who have ownership rights.276 This alternative might impact executive
compensation decision-making, but may not be lead to optimal results as shareholders
often desire not to have a substantial role in decision-making.
Perhaps the most effective way to police executive compensation is to empower
shareholders by giving them more power vis-à-vis the directors in a general manner.277
That is, ensure that director interests are aligned with the shareholders. This change
would most likely require the state legislature to act.278 Although state law gives
shareholders great latitude to tailor charter provisions away from the default statutory
rules, Professor Henry Hansmann has explained the preference for statutory defaults as
follows:
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The provisions of corporate law are essentially contract terms that can be
repeatedly reformed by a third party--the state--to adapt them to changing
circumstances. Thus, paradoxically, the great advantage of law over
contract in organizing corporations is that rules of law are more easily
changed.279
Giving the shareholders more power could be accomplished by giving the shareholders
a greater role in setting director compensation by virtue of a statutory provision requiring
shareholder approval of director compensation packages. Additionally, the shareholders
might also have a more meaningful role in the appointment and reelection of the board,
which could also be accomplished by statutory changes.280
Reinvigorating the director election process could go a long way in improving executive
compensation decision-making by establishing a check on the alignment of directorshareholder interests.281 Yet, these potential changes would still leave core decisionmaking on compensation matters with the board and compensation committees
themselves, which is consistent with the authority of the board to manage corporate
affairs. Although the SEC has proposed rules that would allow shareholders a greater
role in the nomination process and access to the proxy, a similar result seems more
naturally effectuated under state law. Even if shareholders don’t always vote on all
matters before them on a regular basis, shareholders might be more active if there are
alternatives to sitting directors or an ability to withhold votes from a sitting director who
has voted in favor of an excessive compensation package.
State legislatures undoubtedly have an interest in maintaining their control over corporate
governance matters as a whole. As the Supreme Court stated in Cort v. Ash:282
“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation.” 283 A number of alternatives are certainly available for state
readjustment of executive compensation practices. Of these, giving shareholders more
involvement in the nomination and election of directors appears to be an attractive option
as it should not seriously impact the director’s role in managing the corporate enterprise.
Those who believe that executive compensation needs further policing, however, can
expect the proponents of the existing state corporate governance regime that does not
meaningfully distinguish compensation decisions from other routine corporate decisions
to say that there is no problem with executive compensation practices and that allowing
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shareholders greater involvement in corporate affairs is a bad thing.284 Even with
Delaware’s pro-business history, that might be a difficult position if public outrage over
executive compensation continues or another corporate scandal comes to light.
C. Special Concerns About Self Regulated Organizations
An alternative to state or federal action is simply self regulation of executive
compensation by the corporate community. Corporations engage in a form of self
regulation with respect to corporate governance, primarily through listing requirements of
SROs, such as the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Inc. ("NASDAQ"). For
instance, SRO rules require members to have a majority of independent directors.285
Further, the compensation and nominated committees must be staffed with these
independent directors.286 The compensation committee itself must have a charter and the
committee must review and approve company goals related to executive
compensation.287
More recently, however, the SROs enacted new listing standards in an attempt to
strengthen board independence requirements and expand shareholder approval
requirements for certain executive compensation plans.288 Under NYSE requirements
shareholder approval is a requirement: (1) for equity compensation plans; (2) prior to the
issuance of common stock to directors, officers and related parties in the event such
issuance exceeds one percent of the number of shares of common stock of the company
or one percent of the voting power prior to issuance and (3) prior to the issuance of
common stock if the stock will have voting power exceeding twenty percent of the voting
power or twenty percent of the common stock.289 NASDAQ Rule 4350 is similar and
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mandates shareholder approval of certain equity compensation plans.290
Although these efforts increase shareholder involvement in compensation matters, they
do so only on a marginal basis, with respect to certain equity compensation plans.291
Even for these plans, shareholder involvement in the awards made under such plans is
only contemplated in a limited situation where the award is enough to strike the one
percent threshold, a scenario unlikely in the context of a publicly held company. The
SRO rules related to equity compensation plans will not result in changes needed to
executive compensation practices as a whole.
SRO rules leave executive compensation practices as a whole undisturbed. Shareholder
involvement is only with respect to a small aspect of executive compensation. The rules
requiring independent directors do not change the character of executive compensation
decisions since these directors are still subject to influences that impair their ability to act
more in line with shareholder interests, such as a desire to get reelected and to get along
with the current CEO.292 While it might be possible for listing requirements to be
substantially amended to overhaul the way in which interests are aligned and the way in
which compensation, particularly equity based, is used, 293 such reforms appear unlikely
given the current relationships between executives and directors.
Moreover, the SROs have always had the ability to act in this area, yet have failed to take
action. Despite shareholder calls for increased disclosure, most companies are only
responding to the threat of SEC requirements under the Proposed Regulations. 294 If past
practice is any indicator, companies will not make changes to executive compensation
practices on their own, even in the face of shareholder objections once enhanced
disclosure is made.295
VI. Conclusion
The Proposed Regulations, even with the shortcomings discussed above, is nevertheless
likely to become final regulation. Even if the prospects for revising executive
compensation accountability is not at hand, disclosure is meaningful and companies will
have to comply. One can anticipate some problems in applying the Proposed Regulations
to specific compensation agreements, perquisites and retirement and severance benefits.
These problems with disclosure, information overload and the looming challenge of
boilerplate, remain to be resolved.
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As we address the broader issues raised by ever rising executive compensation packages,
we must recognize that using information disclosure as a primary regulatory approach is
an ambitious goal and may not be workable in the absence of other measures. While the
lesser goal of the Proposed Regulations of increasing disclosure is in reach, some of the
issues such as defining compensation elements present under the Existing Regulations
will remain. Companies will be subject to an increased burden of information disclosure
as a filed document creating liability for misstatements under the Exchange Act, but
while the information is supposed to help the public understand executive compensation
packages and practices, there is no specific remedy to shareholders in the absence of a
lack of due care, good faith or waste to react to the information presented short of selling
their stock.
Although the federal government has traditionally been involved in information
disclosure of the type set forth in the Regulations and has on occasion entered the realm
of corporate governance more directly, corporate governance is traditionally a matter for
state government regulations. Creating a system of corporate governance where the
decision makers concerning executive compensation matters are accountable to the
shareholders is daunting. While finalizing the Proposed Regulations may have a calming
effect on a public that objects to compensation packages that do not relate to performance
of the executive, a closer examination reveals that this issue is far from resolved and will
require more attention.

